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SITUATING LIBERALISM IN
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL SPACE
“. . . a call to increase ‘collaboration’ between international lawyers
and international relations theorists, together with the sociology of
the end-of-State (as we know it) and the political enthusiasm about
the spread of ‘liberalism,’ constitutes an academic project that can-
not but buttress the justification of American hegemony in the
world.”
  – Martti Koskenniemi, Image of Law and International Rela-
tions1
“By the end of the nineteenth century, German forestry science
was hegemonic.”
   – James C. Scott, SEEING LIKE A STATE2
I.  INTRODUCTION
German forestry science sought to bring legibility and rational
simplicity to the forest, driven by a commercial and bureaucratic logic
to maximize the return of timber.  The well-managed and aestheti-
cally ordered forest succeeded in producing prodigious amounts of a
single commodity.3  Over time, however, the scientific management of
forests failed miserably, introducing a new word to the vocabulary of
German forestry science—Waldsterben (forest death).4  According to
Scott, the simplification of the forest disrupted the complex, symbi-
otic logic of the forest.5  As it turns out, “[m]onocultures are, as a rule,
more fragile and hence more vulnerable to the stress of disease and
weather than polycultures are.”6  The current debate over liberalism
Copyright © 2002 by Don Suh
1. Martti Koskenniemi, Carl Schmitt, Hans Morgenthau, and the Image of Law and Inter-
national Relations, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 17, 30 (Michael Byers
ed., 2000).
2. JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE
HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED 19 (1998).
3. Id. at 13.
4. Id. at 20.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 21.
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as an ordering principle of international, or more accurately, transna-
tional legal space, evokes images of large-scale schematization.  Dis-
sident voices interested in the preservation of political and legal poly-
cultures are therefore advocating a closer look at liberalism’s
implications.7
The effort to integrate international law and international rela-
tions has reached an analytical juncture that for some scholars offers
a rich minefield of academic inquiry.  For others, the effort signals a
disturbing turn in an already normatively tinged enterprise.  For ex-
ample, Ann-Marie Slaughter’s suggestion of liberalism as a heuristic
device is certainly useful in re-imagining conceptions of international
law within a “disaggregated” order of liberal States.8  However, as the
quote by Koskenniemi above illustrates, this call to liberalism can be
seen as an endeavor to orient the discursive framework toward fur-
ther entrenching hegemonic influence.9  Andrew Hurrell also won-
ders, “[W]hose interests are being served by which governance
mechanisms and whose values protected and promoted” by Slaugh-
ter’s transnational, technocratic approach.10  Slaughter herself recog-
nizes that these critiques pose the “sharpest challenge” to her concep-
tion of transgovernmental networks,11 yet she does not offer a
satisfying defense.
Why is there such concern over the implications of liberalism?  Is
there something deeper at work than a concern that ‘valid laws’ are
being eroded?  And why is Slaughter unable to offer a lucid and pow-
erful argument against this line of criticism?  This note traverses the
trail of Koskenniemi’s intuition and maps out his gestalt reaction
more concretely.  It explores where the trail leads, what is found, and
ultimately, whether what has been found is helpful in better under-
standing the relationship between international law and politics.  As
in the Koskenniemi article,12 it is with a sense of caution that I ap-
proach the recourse to liberalism.  As Latham states, “[L]ittle seems
7. See, e.g., Koskenniemi, supra note 1; see also Andrew Hurrell, Conclusion: International
Law and the Changing Constitution of International Society, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 326, 341 (Michael Byers ed., 2000).
8. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy through Government Net-
works, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 177, 178 (Michael Byers ed., 2000).
9. See Koskenniemi, supra note 1, at 30.
10. Hurrell, supra note 7, at 341.
11. Slaughter, supra note 8, at 204.
12. See generally Koskenniemi, supra note 1.
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to be known about how liberalism affects political and social life
when viewed from a global perspective.”13
This note is a theoretically oriented attempt to track and analyze
a particular intellectual discourse occurring in international legal
scholarship.  In unpacking the contents of liberalism, this note will
first determine the character of the setting in which liberalism oper-
ates—namely, transnational legal space.  It will then examine what
liberalism entails, analyzing transgovernmental networks and their
relation to liberal order building.  I will also look more closely at Ko-
skenniemi’s argument, and suggest ways to situate Koskenniemi’s ar-
gument to better understand the underlying issues posed by his cri-
tique.  I argue that in addition to the proffered argument that
liberalism sounds similar to Schmitt’s “space and greater-space,”
there is also a sense that a “world of liberal States” has connotations
of liberal modernity due to its schematic nature.14  I will discuss liberal
modernity in relation to Slaughter’s suggestion of transnational tech-
nocracy by focusing on the role of technocrats in building an order
based on principles of liberalism.  Finally, I will argue that while a cri-
tique such as Koskenniemi’s is illuminating, ultimately, it does not
capture sufficiently the complex dynamics of transnational legal proc-
esses, international law, and international politics today.
II.  IMAGINING TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL SPACE
International legal scholarship has perhaps outlived its useful-
ness.  Stretched and twisted in so many ways to explain and justify the
panoply of “international” occurrences, not only has international law
become an unfalsifiable monolith, it has become tiresome.  As evi-
denced by the September 11 terrorist attacks, and the awkward U.S.
attempts to identify an enemy, an increasing number of actors and ac-
tions are taking place in an ambiguous space that is neither domestic
nor international.  This increasingly important extra-category is
transnational space.
Susanne Hoeber Rudolph states that “until recently, there were
no words and metaphors for designating and populating the liminal
space that cuts across inside/outside, a space that is neither within the
state nor an aspect of the international state system but animates
13. ROBERT LATHAM, THE LIBERAL MOMENT: MODERNITY, SECURITY, AND THE
MAKING OF THE POSTWAR INTERNATIONAL ORDER 2 (1997).
14. See generally Koskenniemi, supra note 1.
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both.”15  As Rudolph suggests, surprisingly little is known about
transnational space, especially transnational legal space.  Even a cur-
sory look through numerous legal dictionaries reveals nothing be-
tween entries for “transmission of shares” and “transsexual.”16  While
in non-legal disciplines, most frequently, for example, at the fringes of
political science, the transnational phenomenon has received consid-
erable attention,17 in legal scholarship, the notion of transnational le-
gal space as a viable and real space is only now starting to take root.
Rudolph observes that “[t]housands of interveners in transna-
tional space have the authority and power to provide an alternative to
state activity, not replace it,” and that transnational activity does not
suggest the “collapse or demise of states but rather the thinning of
their effect, function, and finality.”18  This important aspect of global
life has gone largely unnoticed in international legal scholarship,
causing much analytical discord within the field of international law.
Carving out and developing a separate transnational legal space, even
if only for the sake of heuristic purposes, would provide an extra set
of tools with which to analyze global phenomenon, and also save in-
ternational law from itself by restoring specificity and particularity to
the discipline.  Of course, international law scholars have spoken
about transnational processes, and because processes and actions
cannot occur in a vacuum, have tacitly acknowledged the existence of
a transnational legal space.19  However, a systematic study dealing
with transnational legal space itself, an examination of what it looks
like, how it is shaped, and who shapes it, is lacking.
Legal scholars such as Slaughter are becoming increasingly aware
of the importance of this fluid space, and are trying to contribute to
its understanding, while at the same time shaping its contours.
Slaughter states that transgovernmental networks “offer the world a
15. Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, Introduction: Religion, States, and Transnational Civil Soci-
ety, in TRANSNATIONAL RELIGION & FADING STATES 1, 1 (Susanne Hoeber Rudolph & James
Piscatori eds., 1997).
16. OXFORD DICTIONARY OF LAW  472 (4th ed. 1997); see also MERRIAM WEBSTER’S
DICTIONARY OF LAW (1996).  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY contains an entry for “transnational
law,” but it is useless, as it defines the term too broadly.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1504 (7th
ed. 1999) (“1. General principles of law recognized by civilized nations”).
17. Most of the discussion on transnationalism and transnational actors has been framed in
terms of transnational civil society.  See Hoeber Rudolph, supra note 15, at 9.
18. Id. at 15.
19. See, e.g., supra note 8; see also infra note 27.  Also, there is an increasing number of
studies dealing with norms and their effects on legalization, which occur largely in transnational
legal space.  See generally Special Issue, Legalization and World Politics, 54 INT’L ORG. 385
(2000).
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blueprint for the international architecture of the 21st century.”20  As
transnational forces jostle the State and influence State behavior, the
grand prize will go to those who can imagine and construct the archi-
tecture of transnational space, install the pathways of discourse, and
imbue that space with “appropriate” ideological underpinnings.
Taking a geographical approach to the study of law, Nicholas
Blomley asks, “[I]f we assume that law is both temporal and spatial,
then might not legal geographies—representations of the spaces of
[sic] social and political life—be as vital to the legal project as its con-
struction of contingent histories?”21  Blomley suggests that legal geog-
raphies “seek to reconstruct the law-space nexus so as to accord
proper recognition to both and to affirm the complex interplay of the
two, evaluating the manner in which legal practice serves to produce
space yet, in turn, is shaped by a sociospatial context.”22  This inter-
play, for Blomley and others, is not a neutral process, but one that is
politically and ideologically driven.  Lefebvre also asserts flatly that
“space is political and ideological.  It is a product literally filled with
ideologies.”23  If space is always political and ideological, this must
also necessarily speak to its architectural process.  As space cannot be
created or conceived without enclosure, we need to understand where
the boundaries are—what is being included and excluded—as well as
what the particular enclosure design tells us about the politics of the
architect.24  It is with this spatial and temporal concept of liberalism
that I approach my assessment of whether liberalism is capable of or-
dering transnational and international life.
20. Ann-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 183, 197
(1997).
21. NICHOLAS K. BLOMLEY, LAW, SPACE, AND THE GEOGRAPHIES OF POWER 25 (1994).
22. Id. at 51.
23. Id. at 43 (citing Henri Lefebvre, Reflections on the Politics of Space, 8 ANTIPODE 30, 31
(1976)).
24. Currently, transnational legal space can best be described as resembling a disorderly,
but not illogical, medieval city.  Transnational legal space viewed from above is unintelligible,
the antithesis to the modern geometric, or “grid” cities (i.e., Manhattan, Chicago).  See SCOTT,
supra note 2, at 54–57.  For an excellent theoretical treatise on architectural concepts and meth-
odology, see ANTHONY C. ANTONIADES, POETICS OF ARCHITECTURE: THEORY OF DESIGN
(1992).  For a political account of architectural design, see the pioneering work by Ron Robin
examining U.S. architectural symbolism abroad.  RON ROBIN, ENCLAVES OF AMERICA: THE
RHETORIC OF AMERICAN POLITICAL ARCHITECTURE ABROAD, 1900-1965 (1992).
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III.  A WORLD OF LIBERAL STATES AND
TRANSGOVERNMENTAL NETWORKS
As the primacy of the State in both international relations and
international law slowly erodes, scholars and practitioners alike are
looking to transnational dynamics to explain international outcomes.
Certainly, the State plays an important role as an analytical unit in
both international law and international relations, but increasingly,
contestation is taking place in transnational space.  From Koh’s
“transnational legal process”25 to Aceves’ “transnational law litiga-
tion,”26 the increasing academic focus on transnational space not only
reflects the increasing sophistication of international legal scholar-
ship, but also signals the growing influence and debate over “liberal-
ism” as an appropriate analytical device.27
Modern liberalism is characterized by three core assumptions.28
First, the main actors in international life are rational individuals and
private groups who pursue their interests within the constraints of
material scarcity and differing values and societal influence.29  Second,
the State and other institutions represent individuals and private
25. Harold Hongju Koh, The 1994 Roscoe Pound Lecture: Transnational Legal Process, 75
NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996).
26. William J. Aceves, Liberalism and International Legal Scholarship: The Pinochet Case
and the Move Toward a Universal System of Transnational Law Litigation, 41 HARV. INT’L L.J.
129 (2000).
27. Liberalism, in its various guises, has had a long life in the study of international law and
politics.  Work done by Chayes, Ehrlich, and Lowenfeld, focusing on international legal process,
the New Haven School on political science, and Harold Koh’s conception of transnational legal
process, all share the common thread of looking into the “blackbox” of the State (usually a lib-
eral State) to explain State behavior.  ABRAM CHAYES, THOMAS EHRLICH & ANDREAS F.
LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR AN INTRODUCTORY
COURSE (1968); On the work of the New Haven School, see HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES
S. MCDOUGAL, II JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY: STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE AND
POLICY (1992); Koh, supra note 25.  For excellent histories of international legal scholarship and
liberalism, see David Kennedy, When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against the Box, 32 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. 335 (2000); Mary Ellen O’Connell, New International Legal Process, 93 AM. J.
INT’L L. 334 (1999); Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Rela-
tions Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 205 (1993).
28. I use “modern liberalism” here to distinguish this iteration from the more established
notions of liberalism.  Slaughter’s version of liberalism is directly related to the neo-Kantian
democratic peace theory.  For a comprehensive overview of liberalism in its various guises, see
MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC
PHILOSOPHY (1996); LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS (Michael J. Sandel ed., 1984).  Also see the
seminal work by LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA: AN INTERPRETATION
OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT SINCE THE REVOLUTION (1955).  Although in a slightly
different context, see JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES WITH “THE IDEA OF PUBLIC
REASON REVISITED” (1999).
29. Aceves, supra note 26, at 137.
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groups and behave according to their constituents’ preferences.30
Third, the configuration and interaction of State preferences deter-
mine a State’s behavior, implying the transnational nature of liberal-
ism.31  According to Slaughter, “the Liberal emphasis on the social in-
teraction of individuals and groups as the underlying determinants of
State behavior recasts transnational law as a primary contributor to
world order.”32  In effect, liberalism renders the State as a transparent
package of processes and practices, and proposes to examine the
“black box” of sovereignty by peering into the State to determine to
what extent governments and other institutions represent the prefer-
ences of its individuals and groups.33
Finally, liberalism is primarily a study of law among liberal
States—democracies (liberal States) are presumed to act differently
from “non-liberal” States (dictatorships), both domestically and in-
ternationally.34  The relations among liberal States differ from rela-
tions between liberal States and non-liberal States.  Underlying this
difference is the assumption that liberal States hold certain values,
practices, and institutions in common, and therefore operate under a
similar understanding of domestic and international life.35
Building on the core assumptions of liberalism, in International
Law in a World of Liberal States, Anne-Marie Slaughter conceptual-
izes a world of liberal States engaged in a dense network of transna-
tional communication, interaction, and understanding.36  Further re-
fining the definition of liberalism, Slaughter states, “[L]iberal States
are States with some form of representative democracy, a market
economy based on private property rights, and constitutional protec-
tions of civil and political rights.”37  Slaughter hypothesizes the liberal
State as a “disaggregated entity composed of its component political
institutions.”38  Such components include the legislative, judicial, ex-
ecutive, and administrative institutions of the State.  In this liberal
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Slaughter Burley, supra note 27, at 230.
33. See id. at 207.
34. Aceves, supra note 26, at 137.
35. See generally Slaughter Burley, supra note 27, at 226–35.
36. Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 503, 512–14 (1995).
37. Id. at 509.
38. Id. at 505.
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State, “power and responsibility are equally dispersed . . . with multi-
ple centres of authority.”39
In Slaughter’s hypothetical world of liberal States, each State in-
stitution engages in transnational transactions with other liberal
States’ corresponding institutions.  So, for example,  legislatures
among liberal States would interact extensively due to “an awareness
of a common or complementary function . . . and a simultaneous rec-
ognition of an obligation to defend and promote the interests of a
particular subset of individuals and groups in transnational society.”40
These dense transnational networks, in turn, would constitute a
transnational polity that would reflect a shared understanding of
prevalent norms and obligations.  Therefore, imagining a world of
liberal States by disaggregating the State also disaggregates the tradi-
tional notion of international law, replacing it with transnational legal
mechanisms.  According to Slaughter, this world of liberal States is
characterized by a “world of individual self-regulation facilitated by
States; of transnational regulation enacted and implemented by dis-
aggregated political institutions.”41  Slaughter also stresses that her
liberal State ideal-type is not so removed from reality, and that inter-
actions occurring in the transnational frontier reflect just such a move
toward voluntary transnational regulation.42  Joseph Weiler, in his
geological view of international law, hypothesizes that we are now in
the fourth strata of international law, a level populated by regulatory
regimes and self-regulating governance mechanisms.43
Taking the example of the International Organisation of Securi-
ties Commissioners (IOSCO), the Basle Committee, and the Interna-
tional Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), and their in-
creasing use of Memoranda of Understanding (MOU), Slaughter
documents how disaggregated components of liberal States are com-
ing together through transgovernmental networks.44  Slaughter argues
that these transgovernmental regulatory organizations (TROs) have
39. Id. at 521.
40. Id. at 535.
41. Id. at 538.
42. Id. at 514.
43. Weiler states that the first strata was characterized by bilateral treaties, the second
strata by multilateral treaties, and the third strata by customs and general principles of interna-
tional law.  In addition, Weiler states that this fourth strata can be characterized as having gov-
ernance without governments, run by mid-level bureaucrats, and lacking accountability.  Joseph
Weiler, Towards a Geology of 20th Century International Law: The Paradox of Law Making
and Enforcement, Speech at Duke Law School (Feb. 12, 2001).
44. Slaughter, supra note 8, at 181–92.
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an advantage over more rigid forms in exercising “soft power,” and
are quite effective.45  Slaughter continues describing “soft power” as
“the power flowing from an ability to convince others that they want
what you want rather than an ability to compel them to forgo their
preferences by using either threats or rewards.”46  Discussing the vari-
ous merits of these transgovernmental networks, Slaughter concludes
that “they are the optimal form of organization for the Information
Age.”47
The combined discussion of TROs with “soft power” hints at a
project of order building based on principles of liberalism.  It goes
beyond hypothesizing about a world of liberal States engaged in
transnational networks to a more normatively nuanced advocacy of a
liberal world order.  Slaughter’s liberal theory is “prescriptive,” and
“seeks to provide prescriptions to policy-makers intent on creating ef-
fective legal institutions and instruments.”48  This relationship will be
examined further later in the note.  Keeping Slaughter’s work in
mind, I now turn to examine Koskenniemi’s critique.  What latent as-
sumptions operate in Slaughter’s “world of liberal States,” and how, if
at all, does the seemingly innocuous concept of TROs relate to Ko-
skenniemi’s charge that Slaughter’s argument is a “justification of
American hegemony in the world”?49
IV.  KOSKENNIEMI’S WELTANSCHAUUNG
Max Weber states that “every meaningful value-judgment about
someone else’s aspirations must be a criticism from the standpoint of
one’s own Weltanschauung; it must be a struggle against another’s
ideals from the standpoint of one’s own.”50  Taking Weber’s insight as
a starting point, we need to understand the particular Weltanschauung
motivating criticism such as Koskenniemi’s in order to situate it
45. Id. at 197.
46. Id.  Contrast Slaughter’s definition of soft power to Cumings’ definition of hegemony:
“Hegemony is signaled when people do what you want them to do, without having to be told or,
better yet, asked.”  BRUCE CUMINGS, PARALLAX VISIONS: MAKING SENSE OF AMERICAN-
EAST ASIAN RELATIONS AT THE END OF THE CENTURY 206 (1999).  It is striking that Slaugh-
ter’s view of soft power is viewed by others as a synonym for hegemony.
47. Slaughter, supra note 8, at 204.
48. Jose E. Alvarez, Do Liberal States Behave Better?  A Critique of Slaughter’s Liberal
Theory, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 183, 187 (2001).
49. Koskenniemi, supra note 1, at 30.
50. Max Weber, “Objectivity” in Social Science and Social Policy, in MAX WEBER ON THE
METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 49, 60 (Edward Shils & Henry A. Finch trans., Free
Press 1949) (1917).
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within a broader ideological or academic context.  David Kennedy
suggests that, “it would be far more accurate to describe what it
means to participate in a school of thought by focusing on a person’s
argumentative default position, his or her instinct in arguing about
the field’s central questions or basic doctrinal and institutional
choices.”51  As a first step, we need to understand the academic con-
tours of international law, define its discursive parameters, and de-
termine the “political motivations” of its participants.
Like other disciplines, international legal scholarship generates a
robust debate as to how the discipline should be characterized, what
the discipline should include, and how it can be best analyzed.  Some
scholars believe that international law should be more autonomous,
based on State consent, and more rule-like.52  Others believe that in-
ternational law is porous and contextual, and that its study should be
more interdisciplinary, incorporating insights from other fields.53
Therefore, for any given international event, international legal
scholars will attempt to explain the outcome using various lenses,
each contributing in some way to our understanding of the outcome.
But the problem before us is altogether different.
The critique of liberalism in international law scholarship is di-
rected not only at the implications of a mode of analysis, but also at
the proponents of liberalism—namely, American scholars engaged in
an interdisciplinary study of international law and international rela-
tions.  The critique is not of liberalism’s shortcomings as an analytical
tool in explaining international outcomes, but of liberalism’s political
assumptions and motivations, the qualitative nature of liberalism it-
self—it is the politics of an argument that is being contested in the
debate over liberalism.
In Image of Law and International Relations, Koskenniemi ex-
amines Slaughter’s proposed call to liberalism and observes that such
an enterprise is not new—Koskenniemi suggests that history is re-
peating itself when he states, “[W]e have been here before.”54  More
specifically, Koskenniemi sees the story of Schmitt and Morgenthau
playing out again, and the disastrous historical experience following
Schmitt’s functionalist image of international law.  For Koskenniemi,
it is Slaughter’s “logic of an argument—the Weimar argument—that
51. Kennedy, supra note 27, at 375.
52. See generally id.
53. For an excellent discussion outlining the current state of international legal scholarship,
see Kennedy, supra note 27.
54. Koskenniemi, supra note 1, at 17.
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creates the image of law as an instrument for the values (or better,
‘decisions’) of the powerful . . .” that is problematic.55  For Kosken-
niemi, Slaughter’s academic pursuit is not one of merely hypothesiz-
ing about transnational networks in a world of liberal States, but one
that suggests order building along the lines of liberalism.56  It is the
content of liberalism and the implications of that content as an or-
dering principle in structuring international law that motivates the cri-
tique.
Koskenniemi alleges that the American academic enterprise of
bringing together international law and international politics is but a
“special kind of sociology or morality of the international” that de-
formalizes “law into a political or moral instrumentality by the use of
general, evaluative clauses (such as ‘democratic’ or ‘equitable,’ for in-
stance).”57  Koskenniemi seems to be the quintessential positivist in-
ternational lawyer, with a set view as to what international law should
be—unadulterated by sociology and morality, and specific in its ex-
planatory scope.  By outlining the history of Morgenthau’s intellec-
tual transformation and chronicling Schmitt’s functionalist view of
law, Koskenniemi advocates strongly upholding the validity of inter-
national law.58  International law should retain analytical autonomy
from the “sociology and ethics” espoused by international relations
scholars.59  He states that the call for interdisciplinary endeavor pres-
ents the international lawyer with an agenda heavily influenced by an
“academic intelligentsia that has been thoroughly committed to
smoothening the paths of the hegemon.”60  In a very Weberian way,
Koskenniemi sees distinct and compartmentalized roles for interna-
tional lawyers and political scientists; “[i]nterdisciplinarity is not in-
tended to transform lawyers into sociologists or moral theorists.”61
Quite contrary to their Beruf, lawyers within Slaughter’s paradigm
would amount to nothing more than henchmen for the hegemon.
The danger of Slaughter’s work in Koskenniemi’s mind is that by
using a normatively loaded concept such as liberalism to re-imagine
international law, international law is ultimately and fundamentally
55. Id. at 30.
56. See Slaughter, supra note 36, at 514–16.
57. Koskenniemi, supra note 1, at 31–32.
58. See generally id.
59. Id. at 33.  Koskenniemi sees Morgenthau’s abandonment of international law as logical,
because Morgenthau believed that international law should retain validity and be free from in-
strumental uses.  See id.
60. Id. at 34.
61. Id. at 33.
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redeployed to achieve the ends of the hegemon.  This not only dis-
poses with valid law, but it strips international law of its independent
meaning.  Koskenniemi suggests that international law should be an
equalizing force available to all entities and not the instrument of
power solely available to the hegemon.  The exclusive nature of liber-
alism and its world of liberal States marginalizes, and worse yet, treats
as absent, those opposed to liberal views.  Kennedy also wonders
whether enthusiasm about a “disaggregation of the state and the
empowerment of diverse actors in an international ‘civil society’
without asking who will win and who will lose by such an arrange-
ment” is prudent.62
However, Kennedy also asserts that it is wrong to think that,
“American international lawyers are somehow . . . implicated in a
broad American plot of domination.”63  Those advocating a disaggre-
gation of the State in favor of a liberal agenda are also “strident op-
ponents of American adventurism,” and are “themselves critical of
American pop-cultural dominance, firmly empathetic to the devel-
oping world, supportive of the ethic of human rights everywhere, yet
sensitive to the difficulties of cross-cultural understanding and dia-
log.”64  Kennedy suggests that there is no conscious design by the pro-
ponents of liberalism to entrench and enhance hegemonic influence—
the fact that liberalism is a quintessentially American idea should not
automatically associate it with a hidden political agenda of hegemonic
dominance.
Even if we accept Kennedy’s assessment, Koskenniemi’s critique
cannot be taken lightly.  Koskenniemi’s greatest contribution is in
asking us to pause for a moment before innocently accepting the pre-
scriptive aspects of liberalism.  Koskenniemi offers a sober warning
against Slaughter’s “millenist, triumphalist, upbeat” liberal theory.65
But as I will argue, this is where the utility of Koskenniemi’s critique
ends; it does not indicate where we should go from here, and whether
in fact we can go anywhere.  Also, Koskenniemi does not offer an ex-
planation as to how transgovernmental governance furthers the
hegemonic interest—his critique is limited to the “logic of an argu-
ment.”  In the next section, I will attempt to further contextualize Ko-
skenniemi’s argument and focus on the processes whereby transgov-
ernmental networks serve the hegemonic interest.
62. Kennedy, supra note 27, at 412.
63. Id. at 454.
64. Id.
65. See Alvarez, supra note 48, at 189.
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V.  LIBERALISM, LIBERAL MODERNITY, AND HEGEMONY
In large part, Koskenniemi’s critique of Slaughter’s work is di-
rected at her revitalized call for interdisciplinary scholarship.  This
does not, or at the very least, should not, justify Koskenniemi’s rather
harsh criticism of Slaughter’s work.66  There must be something in lib-
eralism’s content, and the prospects of that content being superim-
posed onto the world order, that is deeply problematic as well.  This
“something” is liberal modernity, and it is reflected in Slaughter’s
writings on transgovernmental networks.
Slaughter conceptualizes transgovernmental networks as part of
the transnational process arising from a cluster of disaggregated, lib-
eral States.67  While Slaughter derives transgovernmental networks
from the notion of liberalism, these networks and liberalism itself can
be understood as constitutive elements of liberal modernity.  What is
meant by liberal modernity?
Much of international relations theory is concerned with power
relations between nations, especially hegemonic power at the sys-
temic level.  While theories such as realism and neoliberalism may
explain international dynamics and outcomes at a topical level in se-
lect cases, it is of little help in examining the nature of hegemonic
power, its modus operandi, and the motive force behind its behavior.
These are historical questions that cannot be adequately explained by
acontextual and ahistorical theories.
Departing from the traditional lens of international relations,
Robert Latham, in The Liberal Moment, offers a meta-schematic ex-
planatory vehicle that effectively captures the tenuous, heterogene-
ous, and transnational logic of U.S. hegemony.68  Latham argues that
the U.S. has pursued its international order-building project along the
broad framework of liberalism.69  For Latham, liberalism as a mecha-
nism of order building is not a coherent or consistent set of principles
and doctrines that States draw upon at historical moments, but one in
which the principles and doctrines are contested over time and
space.70  Yet even with its tenuous form, liberal order building is char-
66. Koskenniemi goes so far as to suggest that there are parallels between Slaughter’s work
and the notion of Grossraum in Schmitt’s work.  See Koskenniemi, supra note 1, at 34.
67. See supra text accompanying note 44.
68. LATHAM, supra note 13, at 36.
69. Id. at 4.
70. Id.
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acterized by a certain trajectory toward ideals of liberal modernity.71
Liberal modernity refers to “the patterning of . . . social and political
life through a broad body of doctrines and practices,” and the “rela-
tions between polities and other social actors in the context of inter-
national trade and politics; the movement of people; and the exchange
of ideas and identities (e.g., cosmopolitanism).”72  By Latham’s defini-
tion, liberal modernity is an explicitly spatial and temporal concept
that incorporates into its corpus a strong sense of historicity and ar-
chitectural quality.
According to Latham, liberal modernity, as an ordering princi-
ple, originated in the aftermath of World War II, what Latham calls
the “liberal moment.”73  While ideas of liberalism circulated in the
West and elsewhere in a nebulous form, it was the post-World War II
period that gave shape and name to liberal modernity as a global or-
dering principle.74  With the rise of the U.S. as the global hegemon,
with liberal modernity its ordering vision, Latham astutely points to a
less overt realm of hegemonic power.  Latham states that “a hegemon
must be able to shape the practices and ideas in the international
realm, which is an ability that is mostly dependent on the effective
presence of institutions, norms, and material resources.”75
Building on Latham’s conception of liberal modernity and he-
gemony, John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan state that “the ability
to generate shared beliefs in the acceptability or legitimacy of a par-
ticular international order—that is, the ability to forge a consensus
among national elites on the normative underpinnings of order—is an
important if elusive dimension of hegemonic power.”76  Ikenberry and
Kupchan contend that hegemonic power acquires a new dimension
when leaders and political elites in secondary States buy into and in-
ternalize the norms articulated by the hegemon and subsequently
pursue policies consistent with the hegemon’s conception of interna-
tional order.  In socializing elites in secondary States to reflect the in-
71. See id. at 16.  For a work arguing along similar lines, see FRANK NINKOVICH,
MODERNITY AND POWER: A HISTORY OF THE DOMINO THEORY IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY (1994).  Empirically verifying a project of liberal order building is notoriously diffi-
cult.  However, the field of international history and diplomatic history have contributed signifi-
cantly in outlining the liberal order-building project from the end of World War II.
72. LATHAM, supra note 13, at 15–16 (emphasis added).
73. Id. at 42–48.
74. See id.
75. Id. at 62.
76. G. John Ikenberry & Charles A. Kupchan, Socialization and Hegemonic Power, 44
INT’L ORG. 283, 289 (1990).
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terests of the hegemon, the hegemonic power relies on “normative
persuasion,” a process that entails “ideological persuasion and trans-
national learning through various forms of direct contact with elites,
including contact via diplomatic channels, cultural exchanges, and
foreign study.”77  The authors state that elites in secondary States em-
brace the norms and practices constructed by the hegemon for a vari-
ety of reasons, such as restoring domestic legitimacy and validating
policies that have been adopted due to hegemonic coercion or institu-
tional restructuring.78  The processes described are in line with the
phenomenon of norm entrepreneurs and norm cascades explained by
Finnemore and Sikkink, but with a power twist.79
Finnemore and Sikkink examine various human rights norms and
their effect on policy and rhetoric.  Lutz and Sikkink conclude that
norm cascades are “collections of norm-affirming events,” and that
these are “discursive events.”80  Koh describes this dynamic as “trans-
national legal process.”81  Koh states that transnational legal processes
occur in three phases: “interaction, interpretation, and internaliza-
tion.”82  The six key agents throughout these three phases are: (1)
transnational norm entrepreneurs; (2) governmental norm sponsors;
(3) transnational issue networks; (4) interpretive communities and
law-declaring fora; (5) bureaucratic compliance procedures; and (6)
issue linkages.83  Koh’s formulation of transnational legal process is in
many ways more amenable to describing processes at the transna-
tional level than Finnemore and Sikkink’s conception of norm cas-
cades because it avoids the teleological pitfalls associated with a uni-
directional view of norm flows.
The transnational processes of information sharing, socialization,
and normative persuasion also occur in what Peter Haas calls “epis-
temic communities.”84  An epistemic community is “a network of pro-
77. Id. at 290.
78. See id. at 293.
79. See generally Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and
Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887 (1998).
80. Ellen L. Lutz & Kathryn Sikkink, International Human Rights Law and Practice in
Latin America, 54 INT’L ORG. 633, 655 (2000).
81. Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, 35
HOUS. L. REV. 623, 624 (1998).
82. Id. at 626.
83. Id. at 647–65.
84. Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordi-
nation, 46 INT’L ORG. 1, 3 (1992).  For an in-depth theoretical treatment of the socialization
processes described here, see Jutta Brunnee & Stephen J. Toope, International Law and Con-
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fessionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular
domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge
within that domain or issue-area.”85  These knowledge-based transna-
tional networks and the knowledge-elite that constitute epistemic
communities are bound by a common episteme that carries with it its
own discursive practice, shared methods of acquiring knowledge, and
shared understandings of problems within the discipline.  It is within
these epistemic communities that practices and ideas are promul-
gated, contested, and reformulated.  Koh states that as actors in these
transnational epistemic communities interact, “they create patterns of
behavior and generate norms of external conduct which they in turn
internalize.”86  For Koh, these epistemic communities and their shared
norms are an essential key in understanding compliance.87
It is with the above propositions in mind that we can properly
situate Slaughter’s project and fully understand Koskenniemi’s con-
cern.  Transgovernmental networks can be viewed as the means by
which hegemonic socialization occurs.  TROs and other such net-
works are the epistemic communities facilitating normative and
ideological persuasion in transnational space.  We should keep in
mind, however, that while liberal modernity is founded on ideals of
liberalism, it has heterogeneous elements and plenty of room for the
“exchange of ideas and identities.”88  Also, the above discussion is
confined to the realm of theory—whether hegemonic socialization
along the lines of liberal modernity occurs through epistemic commu-
nities has yet to be borne out empirically and historically.  In the next
section I will look more closely at the carriers and agents who sup-
posedly disseminate hegemonic norms—the technocrats—and exam-
ine whether hegemonic socialization does indeed occur in transgov-
ernmental networks.
VI.  TECHNOCRATS AND LIBERAL ORDER BUILDING
Ikenberry and Kupchan state that “although normative claims
articulated by the hegemon may take root in the public at large, it is
ruling elites that must embrace these claims if they are to have a long-
structivism: Elements of an Interactional Theory of International Law, 39 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 19 (2000).
85. Haas, supra note 84, at 3.
86. Koh, supra note 25, at 204.
87. See id.
88. LATHAM, supra note 13, at 15.
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term and consequential impact on the behavior of states.”89  To better
understand transgovernmental networks and their implication for lib-
eral order building, we need to identify the actors and elites engi-
neering and facilitating the integrative process.  A particularly salient
group that emerges is the modern phenomenon of technocrats.90
The rise of an international technocratic class is an interesting
phenomenon because technocrats inhabit two somewhat contradic-
tory spaces—they are instrumental actors for formulating policies of
the State, yet they are firmly embedded in a larger, transnational
“epistemic community.”91  This doppelganger nature of technocrats
has complex implications for the traditional role of the State to for-
mulate policies.  While States, especially developing countries, must
rely on technocrats to implement feasible policies, the policies for-
mulated by technocrats are conditioned and informed by a larger,
common transnational episteme generated from economic, legal, and
political centers such as the United States.  How powerful or
hegemonic is this episteme?  What are some of the tensions caused by
the clash of transnational technocratic epistemes and the traditional
authority of the State to formulate policies?  What role have techno-
crats, the central actors of Slaughter’s transgovernmental networks,
played in the hegemonic agenda of building a liberal order?
Technocrats occupy positions throughout major international le-
gal institutions and international financial institutions (IFIs).  Look-
ing at technocracy in developing countries, Joan Nelson states, “[B]y
the 1980s, in almost all developing countries some senior economic
officials (and/or influential private economists) had spent some time
as staff members of the IMF, the World Bank, or the regional interna-
tional development banks.”92  This also seems to hold true for interna-
tional legal institutions, as legal expertise becomes increasingly im-
portant.  In the economic realm, the technocrats’ experiences in these
IFIs are crucial for socializing the technocrats in the neoliberal rheto-
ric of open economics.93  According to Nelson, when technocrats re-
89. Ikenberry & Kupchan, supra note 76, at 293.
90. There is a substantial body of literature on technocrats and technocracy, usually in the
developing country context (e.g., the “Chicago Boys” of Chile, the “Berkeley Mafia” of Indone-
sia).  See generally JORGE DOMINGUEZ, TECHNOPOLS: FREEING POLITICS AND MARKETS IN
LATIN AMERICA IN THE 1990S (1997); GUILLERMO O’DONNELL, MODERNIZATION AND
BUREAUCRATIC AUTHORITARIANISM (1973).
91. Haas, supra note 84, at 1.
92. Joan Nelson, in ECONOMIC CRISIS AND POLICY CHOICE: THE POLITICS OF
ADJUSTMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD 330–31 (Joan Nelson ed., 1990).
93. Id. at 331.
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turn to their home countries, they “interpret[ed] external pressures
and attempt[ed] to persuade their colleagues in domestic decision-
making circles, and they interpret[ed] internal constraints and at-
tempt[ed] to persuade their former associates in dialogue with exter-
nal agencies.”94  Therefore, technocrats socialized in international set-
tings are likely to be sympathetic and receptive toward neoliberal
ideals.  In developing countries with scarce human capital, these in-
ternationally connected technocrats serve as interlocutors of interna-
tional norms by attempting to align national political economic sen-
timents with the conditionality imposed by the various IFIs.  As legal
regimes usually accommodate economic and financial exigencies, one
would expect hegemonic socialization occurring in legal circles as
well, especially those bearing a relation to regulatory areas.
To understand the importance and influence of technocratic
groups within the State, and to see the inter-linkages with transgov-
ernmental networks, we need to briefly examine the multiple pur-
poses that technocratic groups serve for the State.  First, political
leaders in developing countries often employ technocrats because
politicians do not have the specialized knowledge to understand the
increasingly technical nature of policy-making.  For example, Presi-
dent Rawlings of Ghana, faced with the pressing need to attract capi-
tal from international lending institutions, once stated, “I don’t un-
derstand all these theories, all this economic blah, blah, blah.”95
Second, political leaders may wish to employ technocrats to “tech-
nify” features of political life.96  Third, and most important for this
study, States opt for technocrats to deal with international affairs and
policy.97  For example, in developing countries with no visible stan-
94. Id.
95. Thomas Callaghy, Lost Between State and Market: The Politics of Economic Adjustment
in Ghana, Zambia, and Nigeria, in ECONOMIC CRISIS AND POLICY CHOICE: THE POLITICS OF
ADJUSTMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD 257, 275 (Joan Nelson ed., 1990).
96. This is particularly true for certain developing countries, where technifying political
and economic issues mute the possibility of ideological contests and destabilizing challenges.
There is a large body of literature pertaining to technocracy and scientific governance.  The
most famous example would be Max Weber’s work on Bureaucracy.  See FROM MAX WEBER:
ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 196–245 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds., 1946); see also MICHEL
CROZIER, THE BUREAUCRATIC PHENOMENON (1963).  For an account on the rise of the ra-
tional State in the West, see BERNARD SILBERMAN, CAGES OF REASON: THE RISE OF THE
RATIONAL STATE IN FRANCE, JAPAN, THE UNITED STATES, AND GREAT BRITAIN (1993).
97. See generally Ikenberry & Kupchan, supra note 76, at 294–313.  For a discussion on re-
gimes in transition, see STEPHEN HAGGARD & ROBERT R. KAUFMAN, THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS (1995) (arguing that most governments undergoing a
change toward democratic governance tend to employ technocrats to deal with international
and foreign policy issues).
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dard of a national credit rating, the largely Western trained techno-
crats provide much needed credibility to entice international lenders
and ameliorate investor fears.  As long as IFIs are guaranteed that
domestic technocrats will oversee the implementation of macroeco-
nomic policies, IFIs seem content to make conditional loans.98  Tech-
nocrats serve as the primary policy coordination point for external
agencies, as well as mediators between the State and international in-
stitutions.  They also serve as a buffer zone necessary for maintaining
sovereign integrity.  For example, in countries with a thin or non-
existent technocratic base such as Zambia, international institutions
such as the World Bank and IMF have exerted greater influence, sig-
nificantly undermining the interests of the political regime.99  Ac-
cording to Callaghy, a Zambian official remarked that “The IMF and
World Bank have become the Ministry of Finance of Zambia.”100
Given the important role technocrats play in many developing
countries (and developed countries for that matter), the notion that
the cornerstone of technocracy, the technocratic episteme, can be in-
fluenced by hegemonic norms is an important contention that seems
to vindicate Koskenniemi’s intuition.  Slaughter herself argues that
transgovernmental networks, within which technocrats play a promi-
nent role, are “particularly effective at penetrating the face of na-
tional sovereignty and defusing opposition based on the ‘imposition’
of foreign or international rules and institutions.”101  It seems that
technocrats, as the instrumental actors involved in the transgovern-
mental networking process, have the potential to serve as the nodal
points disseminating the hegemon’s norms and ideas into the domes-
tic realm, hence confirming Koskenniemi’s fear of a “liberal mille-
niarism.”102
Technocrats engage in discursive practices in transnational space
and often are the harbingers of change for many States.  It is also true
that technocrats play a vital role in liberalization of economies and
98. Of course, abuse of technocratic groups to attract capital for personal or party interests
also occurs in some instances.  According to Miles Kahler, Mobutu of Zaire would “frequently
appoint trusted technocrats to strategic positions in order to attract more lending, and then
abruptly remove them after additional financing had been committed.”  Miles Kahler, External
Influence, Conditionality, and the Politics of Adjustment, in POLITICS OF ECONOMIC
ADJUSTMENT: INTERNATIONAL CONSTRAINTS, DISTRIBUTIVE CONFLICTS, AND THE STATE 89,
128 (Stephen Haggard & Robert R. Kaufman eds., 1992).
99. Callaghy, supra note 95, at 292.
100. Id.
101. Slaughter, supra note 8, at 201.
102. Koskenniemi, supra note 1, at 33.
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markets.  Similarly, legal technocrats study, propose, and adopt legal
doctrines and norms developed in the core countries.  Again, because
technocrats occupy multiple political spaces—transnational and do-
mestic—they are especially effective at disseminating the hegemonic
norms and values.  However, a closer look at technocrats and techno-
cratic behavior in peripheral States show a remarkably different atti-
tude, reflected in policy and rhetoric.103  For example, some develop-
ing countries’ economic and legal development illustrates the
interactive and tenuous dimension of liberal order building—a process
in which the hegemonic vision is sometimes heeded, sometimes re-
fracted, and sometimes subverted altogether.104  It seems that the dy-
namics occurring in the marketplace of ideas is vastly complex, and
not amenable to teleological or unidirectional causal theories.
VII.  EVALUATION
Technocrats and transnational networking can only carry out the
hegemon’s vision of a world order based on principles of liberalism if
the episteme undergirding the epistemic community is completely
dominated by the hegemon.  Seeing transgovernmental networks as a
mechanism for entrenching hegemonic power assumes that the dic-
tates of the hegemon are accepted uniformly and are uncontested by
technocrats and technocratic agencies in transnational space.  In
short, there must be complete socialization in the hegemonic norms
and practices with a unilateral flow of ideas and ideals.  This is hardly
accurate.  For example, Toope, in discussing legal norms within vari-
ous regimes, states:
Law is . . . neither pure substance nor pure process, but a continu-
ing interplay of legitimate means and legitimate ends.  So the com-
mon meanings which arise in regimes do not depend upon one
overarching philosophical goal such as the triumph of liberalism,
but upon an incremental growth of shared perceptions fostered by
103. I will not go too deeply into this subject.  Briefly, Western trained technocrats, upon
returning home, usually “refract” the episteme by interpreting doctrines and practices to suit
local political-economic needs.  For an interesting study of the political role technocrats play in
developing countries, see DOMINGUEZ, supra note 90.
104. For a study of this dynamic, see JUNG-EN WOO, RACE TO THE SWIFT: STATE AND
FINANCE IN KOREAN INDUSTRIALIZATION (1991) (arguing that Korea’s economic develop-
ment succeeded in part by subverting economic models urged by the United States); see also
MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY
NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 5 (1998) (stating that transnational networks are
characterized by “intersubjective understandings,” and that within these networks there is much
contestation as to those intersubjective understandings).
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participation in process of norm evolution which are deemed to be
fair and open.105
In contrast to Koskenniemi’s view that legal normativity is threaten-
ing and imperialistic, Toope takes the view that for norms to be
viewed as legitimate in transnational and international space, they
need to be equitable and just.  Toope highlights that even within the
normative space, the very logic of normative persuasion, requiring
validity and legitimacy, supplies a mechanism of checks and balances.
For Finnemore and Toope, obligation is intrinsically related to the le-
gitimacy of law.106  The two authors write, “[M]uch of what legitimates
law and distinguishes it from other forms of normativity are the proc-
esses by which it is created and applied—adherence to legal process
values, the ability of actors to participate and feel their influence, and
the use of legal forms of reasoning.”107  Along similar lines, Keohane
and Nye state that while there are many ideas and much information
generated by the hegemon, their “comprehension and acceptance de-
pends on how different the assumptions, attitudes, and expectations
of different groups of people are.”108  The processes of validation and
legitimization presuppose a vibrant transnational civil society, a space
in which there is an effective and equitable distribution of ideas and
communication.
James Scott states that one of the main features common to all
failed utopian schemes is a prostrate civil society unable to challenge
the bureaucratic elite’s high-modernist ideology.109  Bruce Cumings
observes that the State and civil society “coexist in a curious zero-sum
fashion: the less the civil society functions as it ought to, the more the
state must grow in power to remedy this defect.”110  The fear of a pros-
trate civil society or a general sense of anomie, at least in the in-
creasingly complex transnational arena, is absent.  From the innu-
merable NGOs to cyber-communities, there is a dense and diverse
network of individuals and groups espousing views, and effectively
communicating those views.  In this space, actors do “try to challenge
the validity claims inherent in any causal or normative statement,”
105. Stephen J. Toope, Emerging Patterns of Governance and International Law, in THE
ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 91, 98 (Michael Byers ed., 2000) (emphasis added).
106. Martha Finnemore & Stephen J. Toope, Alternatives to “Legalization”: Richer Views of
Law and Politics, 55 INT’L ORG. 743, 749 (2001).
107. Id. at 750.
108. ROBERT O. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE 248 (3d ed.
2001).
109. SCOTT, supra note 2, at 5.
110. CUMINGS, supra note 46, at 106.
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and do “seek a communicative consensus about their understanding
of a situation as well as justifications for the principles and norms
guiding their action.”111  While Risse’s contention that power may dic-
tate who has “legitimate access to discourse” and determine what
constitutes a “good argument”112 may accurately describe communica-
tive action, the sheer density of transnational space makes this com-
municative arena perhaps the least susceptible to power influences.
The attempt to constrain this vibrant community with the structural
imperatives of liberalism not only fails, but as a theoretical matter, is
profoundly disturbing.  In all fairness, those espousing liberalism as a
governance network only advocate such connections among liberal
States.  However, this characterization is misleading, as most States
would fall under some criteria of a liberal State, and only a handful
would entirely satisfy the narrow criteria posited by proponents of
liberalism.
In the economic arena where normative consensus might seem
the strongest (in favor of the hegemon), there is a multi-directional
flow of influence.  Research on whether technocrats in the economic
sphere buy into the dominant episteme of market capitalism and neo-
classical economics yields similar results: more often than not, devel-
oping country technocrats trained in the core countries often refract
the episteme to achieve success in the global market.113  In turn, these
development strategies are examined by technocrats in core countries
such as the U.S., and are integrated into a more comprehensive un-
derstanding of economic principles.114  As Latham would have it, even
the macro-historical framework of liberal modernity is shaped by di-
vergent, heterogeneous, and fluid practices, norms, and doctrines.
At this point, it is important to consider a powerful structural ar-
gument.  While the content of discourse and transnational learning
may be heterogeneous and tenuous, some would say that the form in
which the discursive practices play out may be largely dictated by the
hegemon.  Perhaps, as Risse points out, the rules of discourse may
have been set during the birth of the discursive space.115  As Keohane
111. Thomas Risse, “Let’s Argue!”: Communicative Action in World Politics, 54 INT’L ORG.
1, 7 (2000).
112. Id. at 16.
113. See generally WOO, supra note 104.
114. South Korea’s Export Oriented Industrialization (EOI) model is a prime example.
Economic technocrats trained in the U.S., with a thorough understanding of the epistemic un-
derpinnings of their discipline, embarked on a “Schumpeterian” development plan that proved
to be hugely successful.  See WOO, supra note 104, at 81.
115. See Risse, supra note 111, at 16–17.
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and Nye state, while “America did not create globalism . . . it shaped
the form that contemporary globalism has taken.”116  And for a person
such as Dean Acheson, one of the major post-World War II political
and economic architects, to be able to say that he was “Present at the
Creation”117 suggests that liberalism had triumphed a long time ago—
Acheson’s powerful title suggests that the particular framework in
which communication and interaction occurs was not by happen-
stance, but a product of deliberate and consciously designed enclo-
sure.  Hegemonic power perhaps lies in this subtle distinction—the
ability to direct the way in which discussions of norms, practices, and
doctrines will take place; indeed mandating that there will be a dis-
cussion of norms and other instruments of persuasion and influence.118
Latham, in describing liberal modernity, states that the hegemon’s
constitutive presence is much the way that “walls, floors, and ceilings
constitute the space of a house, but may not determine the dwelling’s
purpose, decoration, or the daily pleasure and pain that occurs inside
that space.”119  If we accept this view on its own terms, this macro-
level description of liberal order building would be more realistic and
helpful in understanding the nature of hegemonic influence today.  It
accommodates aspects of contingency and uncertainty of processes at
the sub-level, such as the back and forth of norms and practices
within transnational technocratic space, while still asserting the pres-
ence of a greater order.  So while an argument such as Edward
Kwakwa’s, that most developing countries are “rule-takers” or
“paradigm-receiving,” is well taken, within these paradigms there can
be contention and norm struggles—this at the very least points to a
participatory image of international life.120  But, if liberalism had al-
ready triumphed, why should dissident voices be worried about the
implications of liberalism in its current iteration?  It would seem that
studies of liberalism, such as Slaughter’s, would only be a natural pro-
116. See KEOHANE & NYE, supra note 108, at 252.
117. DEAN ACHESON, PRESENT AT THE CREATION: MY YEARS IN THE STATE
DEPARTMENT (1969).  Speeches given by Dean Acheson during the Truman years also point to
a conscious effort to construct the international political and economic macro-framework ac-
cording to liberal notions.  See Draft Outline Notes for Acheson’s Speech Before the Delta Coun-
cil, May 8, 1947, drafted April 23, 1947, available at http://www.oll.temple.edu/hist249/course/
documents/ach_marsh_plan1.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2002); and Dean Acheson’s Speech on the
Proposed North Atlantic Treaty, March 18, 1949, available at http://www.trumanlibrary.org/nato/
doc5.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2002).
118. These points are implied by Thomas Risse.  See Risse, supra note 111.
119. LATHAM, supra note 13, at 62.
120. See Edward Kwakwa, Regulating the International Economy: What Role for the State?,
in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 227, 232 (Michael Byers ed., 2000).
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gression from an already established macro-framework of liberalism
as envisioned by the likes of Acheson, Truman, and Marshall.  Fur-
thermore, a Koskenniemi-esque critique of transgovernmental net-
works as hailing the triumph of liberalism would be epiphenomenal
and moot.  However, considering the flip-side of this line of reason-
ing, one has to wonder why proponents of liberalism are making such
an aggressive push to influence transnational legal space if liberalism
has already won—are they unsure of American hegemony in the
world?  This takes us to a really interesting question.  Is America a
hegemon at all?
There is no doubt that the United States currently possesses the
greatest military and economic resources in the world.  But American
hegemony, beyond these physical attributes, is uncertain.  Perhaps it
is useful to assume American hegemony for academic purposes; a
closer look at “American hegemony,” however, yields confusion as to
both what “American” would mean, and what “hegemony” would
mean.121  Also, beyond the physical description of liberalism, which is
at best an ideal type, it is difficult to ascertain what the substance or
effects of American liberalism looks like.122  A priori, it is unclear
what liberalism entails domestically, and there is further confusion
when this nebulous, albeit intuitive, ideal is projected outwards.  Even
the notion of civil society within the United States is up for grabs.
Cumings, in analyzing MacIntyre and Unger, states that Americans
“cannot form an intersubjective political community (Habermas’s
ideal) because not only do we not know what its purpose would be,
but we have already agreed not to raise this question.”123  A thorough
examination of this question is beyond the scope of this note.  How-
ever, I raise the issue of the skepticism toward American hegemony
and the triumph of liberalism in order to bring validity to the current
debate on liberalism.  For the current debate to be meaningful, we
cannot accept as a given the primacy of American hegemony or the
existence of a liberal macro-framework.  In the end, Hurrell may be
correct when he states that “the relevant expertise and resources pos-
121. Alvarez provides an excellent synopsis of the various criticisms against Slaughter’s con-
ception of liberalism.  See Alvarez, supra note 48, at 192–94 (arguing that the U.S. approach to
treaty obligations is far from behavior expected from a liberal State).
122. See generally SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT, supra note 28 (stating that there
is a sense of disempowerment arising from the conflict between the liberal self-image and the
actual social and economic governance schemes).
123. CUMINGS, supra note 46, at 107.
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sessed by the United States increases the likelihood that its norms will
win out,” but that remains to be seen.124
VIII.  CONCLUSION
Using Koskenniemi’s controversial critique against the project of
rampant liberalism as a starting point, I have tried to unearth the im-
plications of liberalism as an ordering principle.  I have attempted to
describe the transnational legal space in which liberalism seeks to
govern, and to situate Koskenniemi’s critique within that increasingly
important space.  I have also examined whether transgovernmental
networks and the mechanisms of liberalism had a uniform effect of
socializing peripheral States in the norms espoused by the hegemon.
By looking at technocrats as a possible indicator of socialization dy-
namics, I concluded that such unilateral influence does not take place
and that the transnational discursive space is characterized by a sense
of tenuousness and multiple possibilities.
Undoubtedly, Koskenniemi’s critique of Slaughter’s notion of
constructing law under the auspices of liberalism is a valuable one.  It
is true that in a broad sense, the U.S. has attempted to project onto
the international political, legal, and economic space a greater
framework guided by liberal principles.  But a look at transnational
space suggests that the success or triumph of the U.S. liberal vision is
by no means a self-evident reality.  Within transnational legal space,
where transgovernmental networks and other socialization processes
occur, there is much room for disagreement, multi-directional flows
of ideas and norms, and robust participation.  This all suggests that
American hegemony, and liberalism itself, is not a given, but are con-
cepts and ideals, whose legitimacy and validity is constantly chal-
lenged.
Koskenniemi argues that, “[W]e have been here before.”125  But
history does not repeat itself.  In this iteration of what Koskenniemi
sees as Weimar intellectualism, the backdrop is not the end of a dev-
astating war, but a phenomenally complex and variegated world with
a dense network of individuals, institutions, and States—a world
where liberalism, fascism, or any other governance ideal will be vig-
orously contested.
124. Hurrell, supra note 7, at 341.
125. Koskenniemi, supra note 1, at 17.
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